Wikileaks Cablegate: Pakistan's obsession with India
Wikileaks Cablegate: Pakistan's obsession with India
The latest WikiLeaks expose of classified US documents include many with an India connection.

Cable 09ABUDHABI744, UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD) JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND

Reference ID: 09ABUDHABI744

Date: 2009-07-22 10:10

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi

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OO RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR

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O 221011Z JUL 09 ZDK CTG RUEHDO #3763

FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2753

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0485

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1746

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0922

RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0676

RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0428

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0654

RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 1587

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0104

RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000744

NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA

E.O. 12958: 07/21/2019

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA

QA, AE

SUBJECT: UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD) JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND

COS DIALOGUE

ABU DHABI 00000744 001.2 OF 004

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B

AND D.

Summary

-------

¶1. (S/NF) In a July 20 plenary session of the GSD with a large UAE

delegation, accompanied by a smaller session with the UAE Chief of

Staff, the immediate focus was largely on Iran. Participants

reiterated the good defense cooperation that the U.S. and UAE enjoy,

while noting the need to improve coordination further to deal with

real and urgent threats in the region. In this regard, the UAE put

the threat of Iran's potential reaction to a "likely" Israeli attack

on its nuclear program at the center of scenarios to be considered.

Other issues, to include Yemen, counter-proliferation, Pakistan, the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and extremism were also addressed, but

even these were often seen through the prism of Iranian intentions.

¶2. (S/NF) This message begins with the Chief of Staff's urgent plea

on "munitions" to deal with an unpredictable Iran, followed by a

synopsis of GSD plenary proceedings. A list of UAE participants is

included at para 20. End summary.

Chief of Staff Presses for Munitions:

Urgent about Iran's unpredictability

------------------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) In a brief session with principals only, Chief of Staff

Hamad Thani al-Romaithi (who also participated in the MbZ dinner and

was on his way to Lebanon later July 20) said the UAE cannot act

alone in the region and needs coherent plans -- especially to deal

with the unique threat of Iran. How to deter Iran without provoking

it is a challenge. Ambassador al-Otaiba emphasized how the proximity

of the UAE to Iran magnifies the threat perception; the CoS said UAE

military planning had to consider worst-case scenarios.

¶4. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said the USG did not disagree with the UAE

evaluation of Iran's objectives, but that we need to work to prevent

them from achieving those objectives. Diplomacy is only one tool.

The USG wants to help provide the UAE with defensive capabilities and

our troop presence here should help act as a deterrent to Iran. We

don't want to signal that we will give up on diplomacy, yet in

parallel to that effort we intend to keep the pressure on Iran. We

appreciate the candor of our defense engagement with the UAE. We are

dealing with an unpredictable foe and need to take all precautions.

¶5. (S/NF) The CoS said Iran will remain a threat in any case, as its

objectives are constant. He added that if the Israelis strike, Iran

may lash out at the UAE and around the Gulf -- one can conceive of

many possible scenarios from missile strikes to attacks on isolated

islands to the exploitation of 130,000 Iranians living in the UAE.

The UAE therefore seeks ongoing support from the region's "main

actor," the U.S., and desires close defense coordination. The UAE's

friends in the GCC, on the other hand, are not always realistic in

their approach to Iran, he said, citing Arab misinterpretation of

"brotherly" Iraqi intentions with regards to Kuwait back in 1990.

¶6. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said that our message to Iran is that threats

against our allies will not go unanswered. We need to be prepared in

case deterrence does not work, with the realization that with or

without nuclear weapons Iran seeks to be a dominant power in the

region. This is a very interconnected region, asserted the CoS. "If

I was in the Israelis' shoes, I would attack, to reduce the nuclear

threat." The first reaction may be that the Iranians launch missiles

against targets in Israel and then the Gulf, he added. Air Chief

Sweidan added that the UAE needs munitions on a tighter timeline than

previously assumed -- with urgent needs in 2010, 11, and 12. He said

the UAE Armed Forces could receive munitions from the U.S. inventory

and then replenish them later (he supplied the same list of

requirements as was relayed some months ago, noting that they had

only received a "political" answer to that inquiry thus far).

ABU DHABI 00000744 002 OF 004

¶7. (S/NF) The CoS was appreciative of Patriot deployments, progress

on command and control systems, and movement toward more effective

shared early warning, but lamented that other pieces of the air

defense puzzle require immediate attention. Ambassador al-Otaiba

reiterated the need to "borrow from U.S. inventories" to meet urgent

timelines. A/S Vershbow said we were leaning far forward for the UAE

on THAAD, for example, and would continue to look into opportunities

to assist, including filling gaps before UAE-purchased systems were

delivered.

¶8. (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of close defense coordination,

the CoS noted that in the event of an attack the UAE may have no time

to react. Taking the fight to Iran may require "passing over U.S.

aircraft carriers," for example, so we need to be in lock-step at all

phases of preparation and operation.

Introductory remarks

--------------------

¶9. (C) The Plenary session of the U.S.-UAE Gulf Security Dialogue

(GSD) convened July 20 at the Armed Forces Officers' Club, with newly

promoted Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih

al-Kaabi stating that the "small but significant" Gulf region makes a

large contribution to global peace and development and seeks enhanced

cooperation with the U.S. He cited UAE troops in Afghanistan, U.S.

use of UAE bases, a robust intelligence exchange, strong

counter-terror efforts, and improved border control as evidence that

the UAE shares common goals with the U.S. Citing the "high

importance" of strong relations among GCC members, he thanked the

U.S. for its role in the defense relationship and wanted to learn

more about U.S. strategies vis-a-vis Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and

Palestine.

¶10. (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow, leading the U.S.

team along with Assistant State of State for Political-Military

AffairsShapiro, expressed confidence in the strength and future of

the bilateral relationship, anchored by common strategic interests.

Recounting shared priorities, he noted that the GSD was being taken

to a new level as we seek strategic synergy in facing real threats

like Iran -- which we are obligated to defend against. He called for

a more multi-lateral approach to counter-proliferation and cited the

need to prepare missile defenses. He lauded the UAE decision to host

LEADING EDGE 2009 and cited the 123 agreement with the U.S. as the

high standard on civil nuclear cooperation. The responsible drawdown

of U.S. troops in Iraq also calls for continued UAE support, he

emphasized, as Iraq seeks to assume responsibility for its own

security and integrate into the region. The UAE's advanced fighter

squadron, growing air defense net, participation in RED FLAG, and

leadership of CTF 152 are all indications of a maturing defense

capability.

¶11. (C) A/S Shapiro emphasized the USG desire to ensure regional

stability, counter extremism, curb WMD proliferation, and tackle the

inter-related challenges of the region holistically. He focused on

the threat from Iran, stressing that the USG was attempting a

diplomatic solution -- if possible -- and would proceed in

consultation with our friends in the region. Recounting the basic

components of our Iraq policy, he also highlighted the need to

strengthen the institutions of government in Lebanon and build

capacity within the Palestinian Authority.

UAE offers threat analysis: all Iran

------------------------------------

¶12. (S) The UAE's presentation of the primary regional threat

assessed that Iran's leadership "genuinely believes that it has

emerged victorious from its clash with the U.S.," with gains made in

Iraq, an expanding "Shi'a tide" in the region, an ongoing nuclear

program, missile modernization, and continued provocation of

resistance in Gaza. While Israel was able to neutralize to some

degree threats on its flanks in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/9),

ABU DHABI 00000744 003 OF 004

Iran's main goals of regional influence were not inhibited. The UAE

assessment continued that Israel may act on its perception that only

"extreme" (and unlikely) UNSC action or unilateral Israeli military

action can slow Iran's nuclear goals. As Iran continues to reject a

political solution, the UAE must prepare for the fallout should

Israel act on its fears. With that, the briefer introduced a slide

on Iran's capabilities, with missile sites in the south of Iran and

concentric circles showing their likely range all covering UAE

territory.

¶13. (S) Iranian promotion of "Shi'ism," coupled with sleeper cells

in the region, magnify the threat articulated by the UAE. If

attacked, it may seek to obstruct shipping in the Gulf and control

(more) islands over which it does not have legitimate sovereignty.

Working in alliance with al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi'a, Iran

is poised to do damage of an unpredictable nature if/when provoked.

In sum, Iran continued as the traditional focus of the threat

briefing offered by the UAE at GSD sessions. Other regional concerns

noted in lesser detail included Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan,

the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and piracy.

Strategic Cooperation

---------------------

¶14. (C) In further briefings, the UAE team highlighted good

operational cooperation with the U.S. and offered a review of the

maturing Critical National Infrastructure Agency (CNIA) which is

taking charge of security on land, along the coast, and off shore --

with an initial focus on Abu Dhabi but an intent to serve as a

federal agency. The U.S. Coast Guard and NYPD were cited as partners

in the growing CNIA mission, with a U.S. promise of first-time

"Nuclear Security Training" in the near future.

¶15. (S) The UAE delegation received a draft "UAE National Defense

Strategy and U.S.-UAE Comprehensive Defense Strategy" document

outlining key priorities in the defense relationship (a document

proposed by UAE Ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba). Without

immediate comment on the substance of the USG draft, al-Kaabi said

the UAE would reply via embassy channels and looked forward to

continuing the dialogue.

Q&A on Iran, Yemen

------------------

¶16. (C) When the floor was open to general discussion, two topics

dominated: Iran and Yemen. The UAE asked whether the USG had any

new information since the December 2007 NIE regarding Iran's nuclear

weaponization program; the U.S. team noted that a new estimate was in

progress but it was premature to comment. The DMI representative

also noted that Iran exploits crises for its own advantage, making

the defusing of crises like Palestine and Lebanon imperative if we

are to keep Iran in check. In the case of Palestine, he added

optimistically, it is time to "cut to the chase" and deal with final

status issues; Lebanon is also ripe for progress, he suggested,

without a drawn out process.

¶17. (S) On Yemen, the UAE said it shared a U.S. concern that a

"failed state" could emerge on the Arabian Peninsula, with terrorist

partners and Iranian influence further poisoning the mix. A

collapsed Yemen "gives us Afghanistan," said Commander of the Air

Force and Air Defense Major General Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi, and

then it presents a long-term threat to the region. He said the UAE

was coordinating economic development support for Yemen while also

trying to assist with political reconciliation. He noted the dangers

of "another Somalia." ASD Vershbow hoped the UAE could help secure a

unified GCC approach to Yemen, as time is running out on the

seccession question and Yemen cannot afford a "two front" war with

both seccesionists and the Al-Houthi insurgency. In a brief

discussion of Pakistan, all agreed that Islamabad needs to focus

resources to fight insurgency rather than obsessing with India as its

potential military foe.

ABU DHABI 00000744 004 OF 004

Positive Conclusions

--------------------

¶18. (C) Enhanced U.S.-UAE cooperation to counter troublesome

financial flows and cash smuggling -- solidified during a recent

visit by Treasury Secretary Geithner -- was noted by the Charge as

another area of productive engagement. Both sides also put in very

positive words about the role of the Air Warfare Center which has

become a proud center of excellence for the region.

¶19. (S) In closing, al-Kaabi raised Iran yet again, noting that its

leadership is not likely to change fundamentally and therefore the

threat is likely to continue. He looked forward to ongoing

discussion of the defense strategy discussed earlier as we continue

to pursue a common vision.

¶20. (SBU) UAE delegation:

--- Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih al-Kaabi, Deputy Chief of

Staff

--- Staff Major General (Pilot) Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi,

Commander of Air Force and Air Defense

--- Staff Colonel Abdullah Saeed al-Hamoodi, Intelligence and

Military Security

--- Lt. Colonel (Dr.) Albadr Shareef al-Shatri, Intelligence and

Military Security

--- Staff Brigadier General Khalfan al-Kaabi, Ground Forces

--- Staff Colonel (Pilot) Salim Saeed, Ground Forces

--- Staff Lt. Colonel Abdullah al-Yamahi, Directorate of Joint

Operations

--- Brigadier General (Dr.) Humaid Ali al-Kitbi, Purchasing

Directorate

--- Staff Colonel Saeed Rashid al-Shihi, CNIA

--- Staff Brigadier General Mohamed Murad al-Baloushi, Air Forces

--- Colonel (Engineer) Ahmad Sultan, Air Forces

--- Staff Lt. Colonel Engineer Jamal Mohamed al-Ameri, Air Forces

--- Major Juma Sultan, Air Forces

--- Staff Major (Pilot) Ali Saleh, Air Forces

--- Major (Pilot) Abdullah Sultan al-Mazroui, GSD secretariat for

plenary

¶21. (U) The GSD traveling party approved this message .

GREENE

Reproduced from cablegate.wikileaks.org


List of India-related documents from the first batch of 226 documents released by WikiLeaks

(India-specific portions highlighted in bold)

- To avoid hurting Pakistan, Turkey didn't invite India

- Bahrain's King Hamad on India's role in Afghanistan

- UN Security Council expansion and India

- Indo-Pak relations and Musharraf

- Pakistan's obsession with India

- India critical of sanctions on Iran

- Saudi Arabia expanding relations with India

- 'Little to fear about India having nuclear weapons'

- Iran could follow India's path in going nuclear

- Differing opinions of US and India

- India benefitting from international security

- Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and India

- Nuclear facility safeguards in India

- Israel-India strategic partnership

- Non-proliferation and India

- Indo-US trade relations and foreign aid

- Sanctions and German business interests in India

- Some Indian-origin people supplying equipment to Iran

- Germany on US-EU position towards India

- Israeli relations with India

- Reliance Industries oil and gas exploration

- US-Indian economic cooperation and Indo-Pak relations

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