Ten Chhattisgarh police personnel and a civilian driver were killed in a suspected Naxal attack on Wednesday.
While an investigation has been ordered, preliminary information is raising questions about whether the guerrillas laid a trap and the District Reserve Guard (DRG) jawans walked into it.
1) Prior intelligence: As per a Chhattisgarh Police statement, an anti-Naxal operation was launched after specific intelligence about the presence of the insurgents in Aranpur, Dantewada. Police say the personnel killed had encountered the guerrillas a day before, and there was an exchange of fire. Some suspects believed to be Naxal cadres were also taken into custody by the DRG and they were on their way back to Dantewada.
Question: Was this prior intelligence a trap to lure the police into the forest areas of Aranpur where the Naxals were waiting?
2) Renting vehicles: At least four vehicles were part of the convoy returning to Dantewada. Two of the vehicles were locally hired. The drivers of these two vehicles were also locals. Past attacks have taught the forces that the movement plans of police often get leaked if private vehicles are hired.
Question: Did the DRG inadvertently give a heads-up to CPI (Maoist) to plan their ambush by hiring local drivers and vehicles?
3) No road-opening party: The decision to not sanitise the route that the DRG jawans were taking on their return is baffling. Witness accounts suggest that after the vehicle carrying the DRG men was hit, there was gunfire directed at the remaining personnel from the opposite side of the road. Remains of wires found at the spot are added proof that Naxal insurgents waited for the convoy and triggered the blast the moment they spotted the DRG men.
Question: Two vehicles ahead of the one that was hit by the explosives speeded through the scene of the crime and got saved. The vehicle that was blown up, overtook an SUV and was hit by explosives 100 metres ahead. Why was the SOP of maintaining distance between vehicles in a convoy not followed?
4) Tactical counter-offensive campaign (TCOC): The month from the end of March to June, before monsoon hits, is prime time for a tactical counter-offensive by CPI (Maoist). Local police had carried out an inspection of the road from Dantewada to Jagargunda recently to check for IEDs that could have been planted during road construction. Usually, such IEDs are planted near milestones or prominent trees to indicate the exact spot to Naxals when the wires have to be connected.
Question: Was it plain bad luck that the IED went undetected? Or, with no major incident in the past few months, had operational fatigue set in?
The focus of the security grid in recent times has been area domination. More and more camps are being opened to deter Naxals from reclaiming a zone and giving government employees the confidence to move to interior villages with anganwadis, primary schools, ration cards, primary health centres, and other facilities.
While the approach has yielded results, the flouting of basic SOP at Aranpur raises the red flag once again. Naxals may be on the back foot but are constantly looking for opportunities to strike. Letting one’s guard down, even momentarily, like in this case, is something the forces cannot afford.
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